



ISO 15118 · PLUG & CHARGE

The ISO 15118 & Plug & Charge Field Guide

The car-to-charger conversation: the session flow, how certificate-based Plug & Charge really works, and where the PKI bites.

What's inside

ISO 15118 is the layer most people wave at and few can walk through. This guide is the session, the certificates, and the traps — for the engineer wiring up Plug & Charge.

01	The mental model	EVCC ↔ SECC, and where it sits in the stack
02	The charging session flow	From plug-in to power, message by message
03	Plug & Charge	Certificate authorization, step by step
04	The PKI	V2G Root, contract certs, provisioning
05	-2 vs -20	What ISO 15118-20 adds (V2G, TLS 1.3)
06	How it spans the stack	ISO 15118 + OCPP + OCPI for one tap-free charge
07	The top 10 gotchas	Where Plug & Charge breaks in the field
08	One-page cheat sheet	Messages, certs, acronyms

HOW TO USE THIS

Message names follow ISO 15118-2 (the most-deployed version); where 15118-20 differs, it's flagged. This is a practitioner's map, not the normative standard — the ISO documents remain the source of truth.

EVCC ↔ SECC, and where it sits

ISO 15118 is the digital conversation between the **car** and the **charger** — formally, "Road vehicles — Vehicle-to-Grid Communication Interface." Two controllers do the talking:


EVCC

EV Communication Controller — the car's side. Asserts what the vehicle wants, and (for Plug & Charge) presents its contract certificate.

SECC

Supply Equipment Communication Controller — the charger's side. Offers services, validates certificates, and controls power delivery.

Where it sits in the stack



ISO 15118 is **car ↔ charger only**. It does not talk to the back office — that's OCPP's job. A full Plug & Charge authorization actually rides all three protocols (page 06).

TWO THINGS IT UNLOCKS

Plug & Charge (PnC) — plug in and charging authorizes automatically via a certificate, no app or RFID. And **smart / bidirectional charging** — the car and charger negotiate schedules and (in -20) send power back to the grid.

On the wire it's **EXI** (Efficient XML Interchange) — a compact binary encoding of XML — carried over **PLC** (power-line communication) on the Control Pilot line, secured with TLS.

From plug-in to power

A DC session runs roughly this sequence. AC skips the DC-only steps (CableCheck, PreCharge, WeldingDetection).

- 1 SLAC → SDP**
Signal-Level Attenuation Characterization pairs the car and charger over power-line comms; SECC Discovery Protocol finds the SECC and opens a TCP/TLS connection.
- 2 supportedAppProtocol**
The two agree on the ISO 15118 version and schema to speak.
- 3 SessionSetup → ServiceDiscovery**
A session ID is issued; the charger advertises its services (charging, plus value-adds).
- 4 PaymentServiceSelection**
The car picks how it will authorize: `Contract` (Plug & Charge) or `ExternalPayment` (EIM — app/RFID handled outside ISO 15118).
- 5 PaymentDetails → Authorization**
For PnC, the car presents its contract certificate and answers a signed challenge (page 03).
- 6 ChargeParameterDiscovery → CableCheck → PreCharge**
Limits and schedules are exchanged; the charger checks insulation and ramps its output to match the battery voltage before contactors close.
- 7 PowerDelivery → CurrentDemand loop → SessionStop**
Power flows; the car requests current in a loop (ChargingStatus for AC); then stop, WeldingDetection (DC), and session close.

KEY

PreCharge is the safety heart of DC: the charger matches its voltage to the pack *before* the contactors close, so nothing arcs. Skipping or mistiming it is how you damage hardware.

Certificate authorization, step by step

Plug & Charge replaces "tap a card / open an app" with a certificate the car already holds. No user action — the trust is cryptographic.

- 1 The car holds a contract certificate**
Tied to the driver's eMSP contract and identified by an **eMAID** (e-Mobility Account Identifier). It was provisioned into the car (page 04).
- 2 PaymentDetails — car sends the cert chain**
The EVCC sends its contract certificate (and sub-CA chain) to the SECC, plus a fresh challenge value the charger generates.
- 3 Authorization — proof of possession**
The car signs the challenge with its contract private key. The charger verifies the signature *and* the certificate chain up to a trusted **V2G Root**.
- 4 The back office confirms**
The charger relays the identity to its CSMS over OCPP, which checks with the eMSP that the contract is valid and authorized to charge here.

GOTCHA — PNC ≠ AUTOCHARGE

Autocharge is a proprietary shortcut that authorizes on the car's MAC address — convenient, but not secure and not standardized.

Plug & Charge is the real ISO 15118 method: certificate-based, signed, and interoperable.

Everything above is EXI-encoded and runs over TLS. Without TLS and a valid SECC certificate, there is no Plug & Charge.

The Plug & Charge PKI

Most PnC failures are certificate failures. The trust model has several actors, all chaining to a common root.

Certificate	Held by · purpose
V2G Root CA	The trust anchor everything chains to. Cars and chargers ship trusting it.
SECC certificate	The charger's TLS identity (via a CPO sub-CA). Proves the station is genuine.
Contract certificate	In the car — represents the driver's eMSP contract (eMAID). Signed by the Mobility Operator.
OEM provisioning cert	Factory-installed in the car. Bootstraps the <i>first</i> contract certificate.
Provisioning / MO certs	Issue and sign contract certificates; delivered via a Certificate Provisioning Service.

Provisioning, in one line

The car proves itself with the **OEM provisioning certificate** → a **contract certificate** is installed (over the air or at first PnC session via the provisioning service) → from then on the car authorizes with that contract cert until it expires and is renewed.

GOTCHA

Contract certificates **expire**. Renewal/update happens through the provisioning service and is relayed via OCPP's ISO 15118 certificate messages. A stale or unrenewed contract cert is a very common "PnC just stopped working" cause.

-2 vs -20

Two generations are in play. Most vehicles and chargers today speak **-2**; **-20** is rolling out for bidirectional and heavy-duty.

	ISO 15118-2 (2014)	ISO 15118-20 (2022)
Power flow	Unidirectional (charge only)	Adds bidirectional (BPT / V2G) — send power back
Security	TLS 1.2	TLS 1.3 , stronger crypto
Auth	EIM + Plug & Charge	Improved Plug & Charge, multiple contract certs
New modes	AC & DC	Wireless (WPT), automatic connection (ACD / pantograph), MCS foundations
Scheduling	Basic	Scheduled & dynamic control modes

GOTCHA

-2 and -20 use different schemas, message sets, and TLS versions. A -2 stack does *not* automatically speak -20 — the `supportedAppProtocol` handshake is what negotiates which one a given session uses.

Bidirectional charging (V2G / V2H) is the headline reason -20 matters: it's the standardized path to a car powering a home or feeding the grid.

One tap-free charge, three protocols

A single Plug & Charge session that also roams touches all three protocols. Here's who does what.

THE END-TO-END PATH

```
1 ISO 15118 car → charger: "here's my contract certificate (eMAID), signed"
2 OCPP      charger → CSMS: Authorize + Get15118EVCertificate / cert status
3 OCPI      CSMS → eMSP: is this token/contract authorized to charge here?
4 OCPI      eMSP → CSMS: authorized ✓
5 OCPP      CSMS → charger: start
6 ISO 15118 charger → car: PowerDelivery – energy flows
7 OCPP      charger → CSMS: TransactionEvent (kWh)
8 OCPI      CSMS → eMSP: Session, then the CDR to settle
```

KEY

ISO 15118 proves *who the car is*; OCPP relays that to the back office and carries the certificate housekeeping; OCPI checks authorization and settles the money across networks. Plug & Charge is the one feature that genuinely needs all three working together.

This is exactly why a real CPMS has to speak all three — and why building one is the fastest way to actually understand the stack.

Top 10 gotchas

#	The trap	What's actually true
1	Confusing PnC with Autocharge	Autocharge = MAC-address hack; PnC = signed certificates.
2	Reading EXI as plain XML	EXI is binary — you need the codec + schema to decode the wire.
3	Underestimating the PKI	Most PnC bugs are certificate-chain or provisioning bugs.
4	Assuming -2 speaks -20	Different schemas/TLS; <code>supportedAppProtocol</code> negotiates it.
5	Thinking ISO 15118 hits the CSMS	It's car↔charger only; OCPP carries it onward.
6	Skipping TLS for PnC	No TLS + valid SECC cert → no Plug & Charge, full stop.
7	Ignoring contract-cert expiry	Certs expire; renewal rides the provisioning service + OCPP.
8	Mistiming PreCharge (DC)	Match voltage before contactors close, or you arc/damage.
9	Treating AC and DC flows as identical	CableCheck / PreCharge / WeldingDetection are DC-only.
10	Blaming the car for SLAC/PLC issues	Physical-layer pairing problems are a common field failure.

THE PATTERN

ISO 15118 fails in two places: the *physical layer* (SLAC/PLC) and the *certificates* (the PKI). Master those two and most of Plug & Charge falls into place.

One-page cheat sheet

Session messages (-2)

```
supportedAppProtocol
SessionSetup
ServiceDiscovery / ServiceDetail
PaymentServiceSelection
PaymentDetails → Authorization
ChargeParameterDiscovery
CableCheck → PreCharge      (DC)
PowerDelivery
CurrentDemand / ChargingStatus
WeldingDetection (DC) → SessionStop
```

Two authorization modes

PnC	Contract certificate
EIM	External (RFID / app)

The certificates

V2G Root	trust anchor
SECC	charger TLS ID
Contract	eMSP contract (eMAID)
OEM prov.	bootstraps 1st contract

Acronyms

```
EVCC car controller
SECC charger controller
EXI binary XML on the wire
SLAC PLC pairing
eMAID contract identifier
BPT bidirectional power (-20)
EIM external identification
```

Stack: car –ISO 15118→ charger –OCPP→ CSMS –OCPI→ eMSP.



KEEP GOING

You've got the map. Now go deeper.

Every part of this guide has a full walkthrough on the site (tap to read):

- [OCPI vs OCPP vs ISO 15118](#) — how the three layers fit together
- [What is OCPP](#) — the layer that carries Plug & Charge to the back office
- [More free guides](#) — Plug & Charge, the PKI, V2G, and the rest of the stack