



OCPP · VERSION 2.0.1

The OCPP 2.0.1 Field Guide

The message model, the transaction lifecycle, the device model, and the traps — the reference a CSMS or charger-firmware engineer actually needs.

A practitioner's reference to the Open Charge Point Protocol — how a charging station and its management system talk.

What's inside

OCPP 2.0.1 is a big step up from 1.6 — a unified transaction message, a real device model, and security profiles. This guide is the map plus the traps, for the desk next to your editor.

01	The mental model	Station ↔ CSMS, and 1.6 vs 2.0.1
02	The message model	OCPP-J framing over WebSocket
03	Boot & status lifecycle	BootNotification → Heartbeat → StatusNotification
04	TransactionEvent	The unified transaction message — worked example
05	Authorization & idTokens	Who's allowed to charge
06	The Device Model	Components, variables, Get/SetVariables
07	Security profiles	The three ways to secure the link
08	The top 10 gotchas	The bugs that reach production
09	One-page cheat sheet	Messages, statuses, states

HOW TO USE THIS

Everything here matches OCPP 2.0.1 (JSON over WebSocket). Where 2.0.1 differs sharply from 1.6, it's flagged. This is a reference, not a spec replacement — the normative spec lives with the Open Charge Alliance.

Station ↔ CSMS, and 1.6 vs 2.0.1

OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol, from the Open Charge Alliance) is the language between a **Charging Station** and the **CSMS** — the Charging Station Management System, the back-office platform that authorizes drivers, starts and stops sessions, and collects meter data. Both sides can initiate messages.

Charging Station

The physical unit. Contains one or more **EVSEs**, each with one or more **Connectors**. It reports state and meter data, and executes commands.

CSMS

The back office (ChargePoint, Driivz, AMPECO, Monta, EV Connect, and others). It authorizes tokens, configures the station, and pushes smart-charging and firmware.

The hierarchy

```
Charging Station
└─ EVSE (id 1, 2, ...) # a point that can charge one car
    └─ Connector (id 1, ...) # a physical plug on that EVSE
```

EVSE id 0 is special: it addresses the *whole station* (used in the device model and some status reports). Real EVSEs are numbered from 1, connectors from 1.

What changed from 1.6

- **One transaction message.** 2.0.1 replaces 1.6's `StartTransaction`, `StopTransaction`, and `MeterValues` with a single `TransactionEvent`.
- **A real device model.** Flat key-value config becomes structured *components* and *variables*.
- **Security profiles.** TLS and certificate handling are now first-class.
- **ISO 15118 / Plug & Charge** support is built in.

KEY

2.0.1 is **JSON over WebSocket** only (no SOAP). If you're carrying 1.6 habits over, most of the friction below comes from expecting 1.6 messages that no longer exist.

OCPP-J framing over WebSocket

The station opens a **WebSocket** (usually `wss://`) to the CSMS, negotiating the subprotocol `ocpp2.0.1`. The station's identity is in the URL path. Every message is a JSON **array** — not an object — of one of three shapes.

CALL — A REQUEST (EITHER SIDE MAY SEND)

```
[ 2, "19223201", "BootNotification", { ...payload... } ]
```

Annotations for the CALL message structure:

- 2: MessageTypeId: 2 = CALL
- "19223201": unique message id (echoed in the reply)
- "BootNotification": action name
- { ...payload... }: payload object

CALLRESULT — A SUCCESS REPLY

```
[ 3, "19223201", { ...payload... } ]
```

same id as the CALL

CALLERROR — A FAILURE REPLY

```
[ 4, "19223201", "NotSupported", "...description...", { } ]
```

GOTCHA

The message is a positional *array*, and the reply must carry the *same* unique id as its request. Parsing it as an object, or generating a fresh id for the reply, breaks the correlation the whole protocol relies on.

Both sides act as client and server: the station sends `BootNotification` / `TransactionEvent`; the CSMS sends `SetChargingProfile` / `GetVariables` / `Reset`. Same three frame types in both directions.

Boot & status lifecycle

1 BootNotification

On power-up the station announces itself with its `chargingStation` (model, vendorName) and a `reason` (PowerUp, FirmwareUpdate...). The CSMS replies with `status`, `currentTime`, and a heartbeat `interval`.

2 Accepted / Pending / Rejected

`Accepted` = go. `Pending` = stay connected while the CSMS configures you (send nothing transactional yet). `Rejected` = wait and retry after the interval.

3 Heartbeat

Every `interval` seconds the station sends `Heartbeat`; the CSMS returns `currentTime` so the station can keep its clock aligned.

4 StatusNotification

Whenever a connector changes state, the station reports `connectorStatus` with its `evseId` + `connectorId`.

BOOTNOTIFICATION — REQUEST → RESPONSE

```
[2,"boot-1","BootNotification",{
  "reason": "PowerUp",
  "chargingStation": { "model": "CS-100", "vendorName": "Acme" }
}]
[3,"boot-1",{
  "currentTime": "2026-07-10T09:00:00Z",
  "interval": 300,
  "status": "Accepted"
}]
```

Connector statuses (2.0.1): Available · Occupied · Reserved · Unavailable · Faulted. Status lives at the connector; the operational state of a *session* is separate (see `chargingState`, next page).

TransactionEvent — the unified message

The heart of 2.0.1. One message type carries a transaction's whole life via `eventType`: **Started**, **Updated**, **Ended**. Each event names the `triggerReason` that caused it and a per-transaction `seqNo`.

TRANSACTIONEVENT — A "STARTED" EVENT

```
[2,"txn-1","TransactionEvent",{
  "eventType": "Started",
  "timestamp": "2026-07-10T09:14:02Z",
  "triggerReason": "CablePluggedIn",
  "seqNo": 0,
  "transactionInfo": {
    "transactionId": "T-88291",
    "chargingState": "EVConnected"
  },
  "evse": { "id": 1, "connectorId": 1 },
  "idToken": { "idToken": "045A2B...", "type": "ISO14443" },
  "meterValue": [{
    "timestamp": "2026-07-10T09:14:02Z",
    "sampledValue": [{ "value": 0, "measurand": "Energy.Active.Import.Register" }]
  }]
}]
```

GOTCHA — USE CHARGINGSTATE

`transactionInfo.chargingState` (*Charging*, *EVConnected*, *SuspendedEV*, *SuspendedEVSE*, *Idle*) tells you the real session state directly. Re-deriving it from meter deltas is error-prone — read the field.

`seqNo` is monotonic per transaction (0, 1, 2...). The CSMS uses it to order events and detect gaps from an offline period.

Authorization & idTokens

Before a session bills, the driver is authorized. The station sends an `Authorize` request with an `idToken`; the CSMS returns an `idTokenInfo.status`. An `idToken` is always an object — a value *plus a type*, never a bare string.

AUTHORIZE — REQUEST → RESPONSE

```
[2,"auth-1","Authorize",{
  "idToken": { "idToken": "045A2B...", "type": "ISO14443" }
}]
[3,"auth-1",{
  "idTokenInfo": { "status": "Accepted" }
}]
```

idToken types

ISO14443 (RFID card UID) · ISO15693 · KeyCode (PIN) · Local · MacAddress · eMAID (ISO 15118 contract ID) · Central (CSMS-initiated) · NoAuthorization.

Status values

Accepted · Blocked · Expired · Invalid · ConcurrentTx · NoCredit · NotAllowedTypeEVSE · NotAtThisLocation · NotAtThisTime.

KEY — LOCAL AUTHORIZATION

The station can also authorize from a cached **Local Authorization List** when the CSMS is unreachable, so charging still starts offline. Reconcile with the CSMS on reconnect.

The Device Model

1.6's flat key-value configuration is gone. In 2.0.1 everything the CSMS can read or set is a **Variable** on a **Component** — a structured, discoverable model of the station.

SETVARIABLES — CSMS CONFIGURES THE STATION

```
[2,"set-1","SetVariables",{
  "setVariableData": [{
    "component": { "name": "SampledDataCtrlr" },
    "variable": { "name": "TxUpdatedInterval" },
    "attributeValue": "60"
  }]
}]
```

- **GetVariables / SetVariables** — read and write individual variables.
- **GetBaseReport → NotifyReport** — the station streams its full component/variable inventory, so the CSMS can discover what a given model supports.
- Variables carry attributes (**Actual** , **Target** , **MinSet** , **MaxSet**) and characteristics (type, unit, range).

GOTCHA

Don't port 1.6 **GetConfiguration** / **ChangeConfiguration** key names over. A 2.0.1 setting is addressed by (*component*, *variable*) — e.g. *SampledDataCtrlr / TxUpdatedInterval* — not a single flat key.

The three security profiles

2.0.1 defines three security profiles. Which one applies is a deployment decision; the station and CSMS must agree.

#	Profile	What it means
1	Unsecured transport + Basic Auth	Plain WebSocket with HTTP Basic Authentication. Lowest bar — for trusted networks only.
2	TLS + Basic Auth	<code>wss://</code> encrypts the link; the station authenticates with a Basic Auth password. Server certificate only.
3	TLS + client certificate	Mutual TLS — both sides present certificates. Strongest, and the basis for managed certificate rotation.

KEY

2.0.1 also standardizes **certificate management** (install/update/delete) and the **ISO 15118** certificate flows for Plug & Charge, so a station can obtain and rotate the certificates it needs over OCPP itself.

GOTCHA

Profiles are a ladder, not a menu to mix. Moving to Profile 3 means provisioning client certificates on every station and handling rotation — plan the PKI before you flip the switch.

Top 10 gotchas that reach production

#	The trap	What's actually true
1	Looking for <code>StartTransaction</code>	Gone in 2.0.1 — start/stop/meter are all <code>TransactionEvent</code> .
2	Re-deriving session state	Read <code>transactionInfo.chargingState</code> instead.
3	Parsing a message as an object	Every message is a JSON array: <code>[2,id,action,payload]</code> .
4	New id on the reply	The reply reuses the request's unique id — that's the correlation.
5	Treating EVSE 0 as a real EVSE	Id 0 = the whole station; chargeable EVSEs start at 1.
6	Flat 1.6 config keys	Settings are <i>(component, variable)</i> pairs via Get/SetVariables.
7	Ignoring <code>Pending</code> at boot	Stay connected and wait for CSMS config; don't start transacting.
8	Bare-string idToken	<code>idToken</code> is an object: a value <i>plus</i> a <code>type</code> .
9	Assuming real-time delivery	Offline, the station keeps charging and <i>queues</i> events; expect gaps + <code>seqNo</code> catch-up.
10	Mismatched security profile	Station and CSMS must agree on profile 1/2/3; Profile 3 needs client certs.

THE PATTERN BEHIND THE TRAPS

Almost every one is a 1.6 habit that 2.0.1 changed. When something feels missing, ask: *is this the 1.6 way?* The 2.0.1 answer is usually "one unified message" or "the device model."

One-page cheat sheet

Message types

2	CALL (request)
3	CALLRESULT (success)
4	CALLERROR (failure)

Key actions

Station→	BootNotification, Heartbeat, StatusNotification, Authorize, TransactionEvent, NotifyReport
CSMS→	SetVariables, GetVariables, GetBaseReport, RequestStartTransaction, SetChargingProfile, Reset, UpdateFirmware

Connector status

Available · Occupied · Reserved
Unavailable · Faulted

chargingState

Charging · EVConnected · Idle
SuspendedEV · SuspendedEVSE

TransactionEvent

eventType: Started Updated Ended
seqNo: 0,1,2... (per transaction)

TRANSPORT

```
wss://.../<stationId>  subprotocol: ocpp2.0.1
Security profile 1 (Basic) · 2 (TLS+Basic) · 3 (mTLS)
```

EVSE id 0 = whole station · EVSEs and connectors numbered from 1 · every message is a JSON array.



KEEP GOING

You've got the map. Now go deeper.

Every part of this guide has a full walkthrough — messages, payloads, and edge cases — on the site (tap to read):

- [What is OCPP](#) — the protocol, end to end
- [OCPP vs OCPI vs ISO 15118](#) — how the layers fit together
- [Every OCPP guide](#) — the full series as it publishes